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Abstract
The vulnerability of palm vein recognition to spoofing at-
tacks is studied in this paper. A collection of spoofing palm
vein images has been created from real palm vein samples.
Palm vein images are printed using a commercial printer
and then, presented at a contactless palm vein sensor. Ex-
periments are carried out using an extensible framework,
which allows fair and reproducible benchmarks. Results
are presented comparing two automatic segmentations. Ex-
perimental results lead to a spoofing false accept rate of
65%, thus showing that palm vein biometrics is vulnerable
to spoofing attacks, pointing out the importance to inves-
tigate countermeasures against this type of fraudulent ac-
tions. A study based on the number of the enrolment sam-
ples is also reported, demonstrating a relationship between
the number of enrolment samples and the vulnerability of
the system to spoofing.
1. Introduction
Biometrics is a maturing technology whose interest is re-
lated to the large number of applications where a correct as-
sessment of identity is a crucial point. However, biometric
systems are vulnerable to attacks which could decrease their
level of security. These vulnerable points can be broadly di-
vided into two main groups [6]: i) direct attacks, where the
sensor is attacked using synthetic biometric samples with-
out specific knowledge about the system, and ii) indirect
attacks, where the intruder needs to have some additional
information about the internal workings of the system and,
in most cases, physical access to some of the application
components. This paper is focused on the vulnerability as-
sessment to these direct attacks (often called spoofing at-
tacks or presentation attacks).
Among all biometric technologies, the human palm
recognition has emerged as a reliable technology to pro-
vide greater level of security to personal authentication sys-
tem [10]. Between the various human hand biometric char-
acteristics that can be used to recognize a person, such as
geometry, fingerprint, palm print or knuckle print, the palm
veins are perhaps the most successful form with highest
recognition rates achieved between these different charac-
teristics [4]. The palm vein patterns are considered stable
and reliable, which means that once a person has reached
adulthood, the hand structure, veins and configuration re-
main relatively stable throughout the person’s life [11].
For these reasons, nowadays palm vein recognition tech-
nology is considered as a promising and trusted biometric.
The fact that the vein pattern used for identification is em-
bodied inside the palms prevents the data to be easily stolen,
as opposed to face that can be captured with a camera or to
fingerprints that can be collected from latent prints.
In this context, the last generation of palm vein sensors
allow to acquire the veins patterns without contact but still
require the presence of blood in the veins to be registered,
which makes more robust these systems against the live-
ness problem and some spoofing attacks. However, acquir-
ing images of palm vein patterns is not impossible and an
interesting subsequent research question is to demonstrate a
method to forge a spoofing attack that can successfully by-
pass a palm vein recognition system for a different number
of identities. To the best of our knowledge there is no such
works described in the literature.
Hence, this paper presents the first successful spoofing
attack to a palm vein recognition system using printed im-
ages. For this purpose, specific spoofing palm vein images
have been captured from 50 subjects of a public palm vein
database using the same palm vein sensor that was used to
acquire the original database. Experimental results lead to a
Spoofing False Accept Rate (SFAR) [2] of 65%, thus show-
ing the vulnerability of a palm vein sensor.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 details the database used in the experiments and the
process followed for the generation of spoofing palm vein
samples. Section 3 describes experimental protocol, results
and some discussion. Finally, Section 4 reports the conclu-
sion of the paper.
Figure 1. SPOOFING PALM VEIN IMAGES ACQUISITION. This figure shows the procedure of the spoofing palm vein images collection.
Printed palm vein image (on the left) is shown to the sensor to be reacquired.
2. Spoofing Palm Vein Collection
A new spoofing palm vein collection has been created
using printed palm vein images from the first 50 subjects of
the public VERA Palm vein database.
2.1. Original Database
The database used in this work for spoofing attacks and
measuring the vulnerability of the tested palm vein recog-
nition system is a subset (1000 palm images: 50 subjects, 2
hands, 2 sessions, 5 acquisitions) from a public database1.
The VERA Palm vein database consists of 2, 200 images
depicting human palm vein patterns. Palm vein images were
recorded from 110 volunteers for both left and right hands.
For each subject, images were obtained in two sessions of
five pictures each per hand. Palm vein images were acquired
by the contactless palm vein prototype sensor comprised of
a ImagingSource camera, a Sony ICX618 sensor and an in-
frared illumination of LEDs using a wavelength of 940 nm.
The distance between the user hand and the camera lens is
measured by a HC-SR04 ultrasound sensor and a led signal
that indicates the user the correct position of the hand for
the acquisition.
The palm vein images have a resolution of 480×680 and
are saved as bitmap image using a png format. The database
is divided in two datasets: RAW and ROI-1 data. The raw
folder corresponds to the full palm vein image and roi folder
contains the region of interest (palm vein region) obtained
automatically by the sensor during the acquisition process
(see Figure 2).
1Available at http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/vera-palmvein
2.2. Spoofing Palm Vein Generation Method
The main motivation of using printed images is based on
that it is simple (easy to do), does not require prior knowl-
edge about the system and it is already proved to be efficient
in the context of other biometric modalities such as the fin-
ger vein [9], 2D face [1] or Iris [7]. This approach is also
motivated by the scarce literature in the area where these
printed images will serve as a reference baseline against fu-
ture more elaborated attacks. In this work let us assume that
the toner ink from the printer absorbs the Near Infra-Red
(NIR) illumination as was proved on previous works [9].
Due to the configuration given by the original database,
the process of the spoofing samples generation can be car-
ried out by different strategies: printing i) all real images,
ii) two real palm vein images (one from the first session and
one from the second), or iii) just one real palm vein image
(selected between the first and second session). In our case,
the last option iii) has been adopted, which means that a hu-
man examiner selected one real hand vein image (one left
and one right) between the ten available per subject on both
sessions.
Finally, the process of generation is: palm vein images
selected are reshaped to (380× 525), then a padding array
of 50 black pixels is applied to the real palm vein images to
emulate the black background and an identifier is written on
the bottom before printing on a regular 80 g. paper using a
commercial printer. Figure 1 (left) shows an example of the
final printed image and Figure 1 (right) shows and exam-
ple of the spoofing acquisition process and how the attacker
positioning the printed hand. After several experiments, a
piece of 100g. paper is applied to cover the NIR illumina-
tion from the sensor, to obtain better results. This solution
was adopted to improve the chances of the success spoofing
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Figure 2. COMPARISON BETWEEN REAL AND SPOOFING SAMPLES. This figure shows real sample images ((a) and (c), inside of a dashed
green line) from the database and their correspond spoofing image ((b) and (d), inside of a solid red line) reacquired by the sensor. First
row ((a) and (b)) shows the RAW images saved by the sensor and second row ((c) and (d)) shows the ROI-1 regions extracted by the
sensor in the acquisition process.
attack but we still notice that without this NIR illumination
covering, the spoofing attack was also successful.
Figure 2 shows the difference between the spoofing sam-
ples created and the real ones. A slight difference based on
contrast and light exposure can be observed, but excepting
the printing effects, the images are quite similar. This fig-
ure also shown an interesting difference between palm vein
from male and female subjects observed on the all database.
Female subjects present more deep vascular patterns, which
consequently are less visible in general.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper introduces the
first spoofing palm vein database freely available for vul-
nerabilities assessment, countermeasures evaluation and re-
producible research on palm vein recognition.
3. Experiments and Results
This section describes the palm vein recognition algo-
rithm, the evaluation protocols, and the experimental results
achieved in this work.
3.1. Reference Palm Vein Recognition System
The experiments in this paper are carried out using the
open source palm vein framework called PalmveinRecLib:
bob.palmvein2. This framework is extensible and allows to
run a complete palm vein recognition experiment, from the
preprocessing of RAW images (including segmentation) to
the computation of biometric scores and their evaluation.
We present below the algorithm that composes the palm
vein recognition system that is used as a reference for com-
puting genuine scores from genuine users and zero-effort
impostor scores from zero-effort impostors, hence allow-
ing to determine FAR and FRR, and whose performance is
measured in terms of Equal Error Rate (EER). Finally, the
same reference system is used to compute spoofing scores
from spoofing attacks (performed by informed impostors),
hence allowing to determine Spoofing False Accept Rate
(SFAR). The full source code for replicate the experiments
can be downloaded from PyPI3 upon publication.
The system implements several baseline methods from
the state-of-the-art and is divided in three stages: i) seg-
mentation and normalization, ii) feature extraction and iii)
matching. In the segmentation process the hand contour is
localised by a binarization from grayscale palm vein im-
ages. Then the hand landmarks (peaks and valleys) are ex-
tracted using the radial distance function (RDF) between
the reference point (generally the starting of the wrist) and
2Freely available at https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.palmvein
3https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.ICB2015
the contour points extracted [13, 3]. The palm region is
extracted as a square region based on the located hand land-
marks and a geometric normalization (scaling and rotation)
on the extracted palm vein region is performed. Finally, the
palm veins are enhanced by using the Circular Gabor Fil-
ter (CGF) approach [12]. Once palm vein region (ROI-2)
is extracted and normalised, the local binary patterns (LBP)
are applied as features [5] and the histogram intersection
metric [8] is adopted as a similarity measure to compute the
scores. The final score of the system per user is computed
by the average of the scores of all enrolment samples for
that user. The presented experimental framework includes
a complete module for scores analysis.
Since there are two different preprocessing configura-
tions (none and CGF) and two regions of interest analysed
(ROI-1 given by the database, andROI-2), this finally leads
to four different systems that are evaluated in the remainder
of this section.
3.2. Evaluation Protocols
For the experiments, each hand in the database is consid-
ered as a different subject. Therefore, we have two sessions
with five acquisition per each for 100 subjects (i.e., 1000
palm vein images: 50 subjects × 2 hands × 2 sessions × 5
acquisitions).
Two different scenarios are considered in the experi-
ments:
• Normal Operation Mode (nom): both the enrolment
and the tests are carried out with a real palm vein im-
ages. This is used as the reference scenario. In this
context the FAR (False Acceptance Rate) of the sys-
tem is defined as the number of times an impostor us-
ing his own palm vein image gains access to the system
as a genuine user, which can be understood as the ro-
bustness of the system against a zero-effort attack. The
same way, the FRR (False Rejection Rate) denotes the
number of times a genuine user is rejected by the sys-
tem.
For a given subject, the first two palm vein images
from the first session (s11−2) are considered as enrol-
ment templates. Genuine scores are obtained by com-
paring the templates to the corresponding images of
the first and second sessions from the same subject
(s13−5 and s21−5) and impostor scores are obtained
by comparing to the remaining subjects, i.e. the eight
images (s13−5 and s21−5) from the first and second
sessions comprised the probe set.
• Spoofing Attack (attack): the enrolment is performed
using a real palm vein, and tests are carried out with
spoofing palm veins. In this case the genuine user en-
rols with his/her palm vein and the attacker tries to ac-
cess the application with the spoofing palm vein of the
Protocol Training set Testing set
# Clients # Files # Clients Enrolment Probe
nom 5 × 2 100 45 × 2
(Real)
(Real) 720
attack 5 × 2 100 45 × 2
180 (Spoof)
720
Table 1. EVALUATION PROTOCOLS. This table reports the num-
ber of genuine and impostor scores of each evaluation protocol.
The enrolment uses the first two images of first session (s1{1−2})
and the remaining are used by the probe (s1{3−5} + s2{1−5}).
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Figure 3. ROC CURVES OF THE SYSTEMS. This figure shows
the ROC curves of the systems on the VERA Palm vein database
considering the different preprocessing configurations and the re-
gions of interest (ROI-1 given by the database and ROI-2 ex-
tracted from the RAW images by the recognition system). The
best system is highlighted in bold.
legal user. A successful attack is accomplished when
the system confuses a spoofing palm vein with its cor-
responding genuine palm vein, i.e., SFAR (Spoofing
FAR), the ratio of the incorrect accepted spoofing at-
tacks.
In this case, the enrolment is performed using the two
real palm vein images from first session (s11−2) as be-
fore and the system is tested by using the eight spoof-
ing samples of the first and second sessions (s13−5 and
s21−5), i.e., the subjects try to access into the system
using a spoofing palm vein image.
For the vulnerabilities assessment on this work, in each
protocol, the database has been divided in two different sets:
i) training set (subjects 1-5) and testing set (subjects 6-50).
The training set has not been used on these experiments.
The testing set has been used to evaluate palm vein veri-
fication accuracy and the spoofing palm vein vulnerability.
Table 1 summarizes the evaluation protocols used on the
experiments.
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Figure 4. SCORE DISTRIBUTIONS OF SYSTEMS. This figure shows the score distributions of palm vein recognition systems on the database.
The solid curve shows the SFAR as the decision threshold changes.
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Figure 5. REFERENCE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE. DET curves for nom and attack scenario of baseline palm vein verification systems.
3.3. Experimental Results
The performance (EER in %) of the four considered
palm vein recognition systems on the database is summa-
rized in Figure 3. It is important to notice that two different
regions of interest have been analysed, the ROI-1 generated
by the palm vein sensor during the acquisition (given by the
database) and the ROI-2 extracted from the RAW images
in the preprocessing by the automatic palm vein recogni-
tion system. In the following, these experimental results are
discussed according to several experiments.
3.3.1 System performance results
The system performance on the nom protocol of the VERA
Palm vein database is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 5, for
the two different regions of interest: ROI-1 and ROI-2 and
the two preprocessing evaluated: none and CGF.
Overall, the best results are obtained by the region of in-
terest ROI-2 extracted from the RAW images by the palm
vein recognition system, which achieved in all the cases
lower EER rates than the ROI-1, generated by the sensor
during the acquisition.
Besides, it is interesting to notice the improvement of the
system performance achieved by using the preprocessing
approach Circular Gabor Filter (CGF), leading to the best
recognition rate of 3.33% of EER in ROI-2 in comparison
to the none preprocessing of 5.27% of EER. This improve-
ment is bigger on high security points (FAR < 0.1%) as
it is shown in Figure 3, where the recognition rates remain
more stable using this CGF approach.
3.3.2 Spoofing attack results
The robustness of the systems to spoofing attacks is sum-
marized on Figure 4 and Figure 5, which shows the spoof-
ing false accept rate (SFAR in %) of the spoofing attack
(attack) against the recognition system at EER operating
point, using the distribution of genuine, impostor and spoof-
ing attack scores. The decision threshold is fixed to reach
a FAR = FRR (i.e., EER) in the normal operation mode
(nom), and then the SFAR of the spoofing attack is com-
puted.
While the almost perfect separation of the scores for gen-
uine users and impostors justifies the good verification per-
formance, in all systems the spoofing attack appears opti-
mal. This is proven by the value of SFAR as well as the
percentage of spoofing attacks that manage to by-pass the
system at the chosen threshold (i.e. a SFAR of about 43.8%
or higher is observed). This analysis proves the vulnera-
bility of the palm vein recognition system to spoofing at-
tacks, establishing the necessity of securing them with an
anti-spoofing method.
It is also noticeable that the SFAR of the spoofing attacks
increases from 58.9% to 75.1% on ROI-1 and from 43.8%
to 65.1% on ROI-2, when the CGF is used in the prepro-
cessing. Therefore, while the system increases the recog-
nition performance, the spoofing attack improves its effec-
tiveness. This observation can be explained by the use of
texture-based (LBP) technique as feature extraction, mainly
due to that CGF preprocessing approach makes more simi-
lar the texture of real and spoofing samples for this feature
extraction technique.
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Figure 6. EPSC CURVE. This figure shows the Expected Perfor-
mance and Spoofability Curve (EPSC) to compare the palm vein
systems in terms of robustness and vulnerability.
Finally, the expected performance and spoofability curve
(EPSC) [2] given in Figure 6, reports EERω and SFAR
for a threshold which considers the relative probability of
spoofing attacks, encoded in the parameter ω ∈ [0, 1],
which denotes the relative cost of spoofing attack with re-
spect to zero-effort impostors. Comparing the EERω values
in Figure 6a, the ROI-2 CGF system is best performing
in verification only as long as the spoofing attacks appear
with a very small probability. After a small increment of the
value of ω ≈ 0.2, ROI-2 none system shows the best veri-
fication performance. The same applies to the vulnerability
to spoofing (Figure 6b), while being the most vulnerable
when ω ≈ 0, ROI-2 none system displays the smallest val-
ues of SFAR for larger values of ω. This confirms that the
preprocessing based on CGF makes the system more pre-
Protocol Testing set
# Clients Enrolment Probe
nom
45 × 2 (Real samples) (Real samples)
A) s1{1} = 90 s2{1−5} = 450
B) s1{1−2} = 180
attack 45 × 2
C) s1{1−3} = 270
D) s1{1−4} = 360 (Spoofing samples)
E) s1{1−5} = 450
s2{1−5} = 450
Table 2. ENROLMENT SET SIZE ANALYSIS PROTOCOLS. This
table reports the number of genuine and impostor scores of each
evaluation protocol.
cise in terms of verification but increases its vulnerability to
spoofing attacks.
3.3.3 Enrolment set size analysis
This section analyses different sizes of the enrolment set
and its effect over the SFAR and EER rates. Table 2 sum-
marizes the different sizes selected (A, B, C, D, and E) for
the enrolment set, from 1 until 5 samples of the first session.
The size of the probe set is the same for all the cases, the 5
samples of the second session from real or spoofing samples
in each case.
Figure 7 shows graphically the evolution of EER and
SFAR rates based on the different number of enrolment
samples. Overall, the EER rate decreases for all the sys-
tems until 3 enrolment samples where approximately satu-
rates. On the other hand, the SFAR rate slightly decreases
and increases for the ROI-1 and ROI-2 until 3 enrolment
samples. The most robust system (SFAR minimum) is
achieved where none preprocessing is applied, as previously
was concluded.
An interesting effect can be observed when the number
of enrolment samples increases, the SFAR rate follows an
incremental trend for the all the systems. This can be ex-
plained by the increment of variability in the enrolment set,
which gives the opportunity to attacker samples to be more
reliable and effective. Therefore, this study showed the ne-
cessity of a compromise between the number of enrolment
samples and the vulnerability of the system.
4. Conclusions
The first evaluation of the vulnerability to spoofing at-
tacks to palm vein recognition systems has been presented.
The attacks have been evaluated using spoofing palm vein
images created from real palm vein samples of the VERA
Palm vein database. This is achieved by printing with a
commercial printer the real palm vein images without any
kind of preprocessing on a regular 80g. paper and presented
to the palm vein sensor.
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Figure 7. STUDY OF ENROLMENT SAMPLES. EER(%) (top) and
SFAR(%) (bottom) of ROI-1 and ROI-2 on the different pre-
processing configurations (none and CGF) for different number of
enrolment samples. For this analysis, the same size of the probe
set was fixed for all cases.
Acquisition of spoofing palm vein images has been car-
ried out with the same palm vein contactless sensor used in
the original database. A spoofing attack scenario has been
evaluated to the normal operation mode of the system us-
ing a publicly available palm vein recognition system. This
spoofing attack considers enrolling to the system with real
images and accessing it with spoofing palm vein images.
Experimental results showed that the system is vulnerable
to the spoofing attacks. The intruder is granted access to
the system with a probability of spoofing false accept rate
as high as 65%.
Two automatic segmentations have been analysed by us-
ing the ROI-1 region proportioned by the database and the
ROI-2 region generated by the recognition software devel-
oped. The effect on the vulnerability of the system of the
image preprocessing by using a reliable approach such as
the circular gabor filter (CGF) have been also studied, prov-
ing an increment on the vulnerability when the complexity
of the system increases. Finally, the role of the number of
the enrolment samples has been also analysed in this paper,
demonstrating an expected relationship between this num-
ber and the vulnerability of the system.
Liveness detection procedures are possible countermea-
sures against spoofing attacks. In palm vein recognition,
there is scarce literature about this topic but several ap-
proaches such as temperature sensing or blood flow detec-
tion on palm could be useful. Future work will explore
the above mentioned countermeasures as well as evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of the spoofing attack on commercial
palm vein sensors.
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